Manual Encyclopedia of Privacy [Two Volumes] [2 volumes]

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Encyclopedia of vibration: three volumes set. The Concise Focal Encyclopedia of Photography. European-style privacy protection regulations have spread rapidly across the industrial world, with the United States as a major exception, and have transformed and led the global privacy debate, while the US has relied on a more laissez-faire mentality about protection of personal information and a patchwork of privacy guidelines. The European Union empowered individual privacy commissioners or group agencies that had technical expertise, were given governmental authority, and were able to form political coalitions to lobby successfully for enhanced individual privacy protection, requiring that personal information not be collected or used for purposes other than those initially intended without individual consent, and so on.

This contrasts sharply with the American approach allowing entities such as insurance companies and employers ample access to personal information not covered by the separate privacy guidelines, given a lack of governmental support for more comprehensive privacy legislation and a more fragmented political system. The US has generally stood behind efficiency arguments that business and government need unfettered access to personal data to guarantee economic growth and national security, whereas the EU has sent a coherent signal that privacy has critical value in a robust information society because citizens will only participate in an online environment if they feel their privacy is guaranteed against ubiquitous business and government surveillance.

In a quite different right to privacy, independent of informational privacy and the Fourth Amendment, was recognized explicitly by the Supreme Court. It is now commonly called the constitutional right to privacy. The right was first announced in the Griswold v. Connecticut U. The constitutional right to privacy was described by Justice William O. Douglas as protecting a zone of privacy covering the social institution of marriage and the sexual relations of married persons.

The most famous application of this right to privacy was as one justification of abortion rights defended in in Roe v. Wade U. Which personal decisions have been protected by this privacy right has varied depending on the makeup of the Court.


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In in Bowers v. Hardwick U. Criticism of the constitutional right to privacy has continued, particularly in the popular press, Roe v. Wade may be in jeopardy, and many viewed the Bowers decision as evidence of the demise of the constitutional right to privacy. Yet in in Lawrence v. Texas U. Jean L. Cohen gives a theoretical defense of this inclusive view of the constitutional right to privacy. She defends a constructivist approach to privacy rights and intimacy, arguing that privacy rights protect personal autonomy and that a constitutionally protected right to privacy is indispensable for a modern conception of reason and her interpretation of autonomy.

Currently many non U. For example, constitutional privacy has been used in the U. In Europe many countries now protect same sex marriage, such as the Netherlands for over 10 years and more recently Germany since One way of understanding the growing literature on privacy is to view it as divided into two main categories, which we may call reductionism and coherentism. Reductionists are generally critical of privacy, while coherentists defend the coherent fundamental value of privacy interests.

Ferdinand Schoeman introduced somewhat different terminology which makes it easier to understand this distinction. According to Schoeman, a number of authors have believed. Theorists who deny both the coherence thesis and the distinctiveness thesis argue that in each category of privacy claims there are diverse values at stake of the sort common to many other social issues and that these values exhaust privacy claims.

The thrust of this complex position is that we could do quite well if we eliminated all talk of privacy and simply defended our concerns in terms of standard moral and legal categories Schoeman , 5. They deny that there is anything useful in considering privacy as a separate concept.

They conclude, then, that there is nothing coherent, distinctive or illuminating about privacy interests. On the other side, more theorists have argued that there is something fundamental and distinctive and coherent about the various claims that have been called privacy interests.

On this view, privacy has value as a coherent and fundamental concept, and most individuals recognize it as a useful concept as well. Those who endorse this view may be called coherentists. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that coherentists have quite diverse, and sometimes overlapping, views on what it is that is distinctive about privacy and what links diverse privacy claims.

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Probably the most famous reductionist view of privacy is one from Judith Jarvis Thomson Noting that there is little agreement on what privacy is, Thomson examines a number of cases that have been thought to be violations of the right to privacy. On closer inspection, however, Thomson believes all those cases can be adequately and equally well explained in terms of violations of property rights or rights over the person, such as a right not to be listened to. Those rights in the cluster are always overlapped by, and can be fully explained by, property rights or rights to bodily security.

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Privacy is derivative in its importance and justification, according to Thomson, as any privacy violation is better understood as the violation of a more basic right. Richard Posner also presents a critical account of privacy, arguing that the kinds of interests protected under privacy are not distinctive. Moreover, his account is unique because he argues that privacy is protected in ways that are economically inefficient. Focusing on privacy as control over information about oneself, Posner argues that concealment or selective disclosure of information is usually to mislead or manipulate others, or for private economic gain, and thus protection of individual privacy is less defensible than others have thought because it does not maximize wealth.

In sum, Posner defends organizational or corporate privacy as more important than personal privacy, because the former is likely to enhance the economy. Another strong critic of privacy is Robert Bork , whose criticism is aimed at the constitutional right to privacy established by the Supreme Court in Bork views the Griswold v. Connecticut decision as an attempt by the Supreme Court to take a side on a social and cultural issue, and as an example of bad constitutional law. Douglas and his majority opinion in Griswold.


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Douglas had argued, however, that the right to privacy could be seen to be based on guarantees from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Taken together, the protections afforded by these Amendments showed that a basic zone of privacy was protected for citizens, and that it covered their ability to make personal decisions about their home and family life. In contrast, Bork argues i that none of the Amendments cited covered the case before the Court, ii that the Supreme Court never articulated or clarified what the right to privacy was or how far it extended, and he charges iii that the privacy right merely protected what a majority of justices personally wanted it to cover.

In sum, he accuses Douglas and the Court majority of inventing a new right, and thus overstepping their bounds as judges by making new law, not interpreting the law. Theorists including William Parent and Judith Thomson argue that the constitutional right to privacy is not really a privacy right, but is more aptly described as a right to liberty.

If so, then liberty is a broader concept than privacy and privacy issues and claims are a subset of claims to liberty. In support of this view, philosophical and legal commentators have urged that privacy protects liberty, and that privacy protection gains for us the freedom to define ourselves and our relations to others Allen, ; DeCew, ; Reiman, , ; Schoeman, , A moving account supporting this view—understanding privacy as a necessary and an indispensable condition for freedom—comes from literature, here a quotation from Milan Kundera.

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There is more detailed evidence that privacy and liberty are distinct concepts, that liberty is a broader notion, and that privacy is essential for protecting liberty. We have many forms of liberty that do not appear to have anything to do with what we might value as private and inappropriate for government intervention for personal reasons. Bell , U. It is clear that the U. Roe , U.

There is no single version of the feminist critique of privacy, yet it can be said in general that many feminists worry about the darker side of privacy, and the use of privacy as a shield to cover up domination, degradation and abuse of women and others. Many tend to focus on the private as opposed to the public, rather than merely informational or constitutional privacy.

If distinguishing public and private realms leaves the private domain free from any scrutiny, then these feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon are correct that privacy can be dangerous for women when it is used to cover up repression and physical harm to them by perpetuating the subjection of women in the domestic sphere and encouraging nonintervention by the state. But, Elshtain points out, this alternative seems too extreme. A more reasonable view, according to Anita Allen , is to recognize that while privacy can be a shield for abuse, it is unacceptable to reject privacy completely based on harm done in private.

A total rejection of privacy makes everything public, and leaves the domestic sphere open to complete scrutiny and intrusion by the state. Yet women surely have an interest in privacy that can protect them from state imposed sterilization programs or government imposed drug tests for pregnant women mandating results sent to police, for instance, and that can provide reasonable regulations such as granting rights against marital rape.

Narrow views of privacy focusing on control over information about oneself that were defended by Warren and Brandeis and by William Prosser are also endorsed by more recent commentators including Fried and Parent In addition, Alan Westin describes privacy as the ability to determine for ourselves when, how, and to what extent information about us is communicated to others Westin, Perhaps the best example of a contemporary defense of this view is put forth by William Parent. Parent explains that he proposes to defend a view of privacy that is consistent with ordinary language and does not overlap or confuse the basic meanings of other fundamental terms.

He defines privacy as the condition of not having undocumented personal information known or possessed by others. Parent stresses that he is defining the condition of privacy, as a moral value for people who prize individuality and freedom, and not a moral or legal right to privacy. Personal information is characterized by Parent as factual otherwise it would be covered by libel, slander or defamation , and these are facts that most persons choose not to reveal about themselves, such as facts about health, salary, weight, sexual orientation, etc.

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Thus, once information becomes part of a public record, there is no privacy invasion in future releases of the information, even years later or to a wide audience, nor does snooping or surveillance intrude on privacy if no undocumented information is gained. In cases where no new information is acquired, Parent views the intrusion as irrelevant to privacy, and better understood as an abridgment of anonymity, trespass, or harassment. Furthermore, what has been described above as the constitutional right to privacy, is viewed by Parent as better understood as an interest in liberty, not privacy.

It is too narrow an account because he only allows for a descriptive and not a normative use of the term. As another example, if personal information is part of the public record, even the most insidious snooping to attain it does not constitute a privacy invasion. Bloustein argues that there is a common thread in the diverse legal cases protecting privacy. Respect for these values is what grounds and unifies the concept of privacy. Using this analysis, Bloustein explicitly links the privacy rights in tort law described by Prosser with privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment.

The common conceptual thread linking diverse privacy cases prohibiting dissemination of confidential information, eavesdropping, surveillance, and wiretapping, to name a few, is the value of protection against injury to individual freedom and human dignity. Invasion of privacy is best understood, in sum, as affront to human dignity.

Although Bloustein admits the terms are somewhat vague, he defends this analysis as conceptually coherent and illuminating. A more common view has been to argue that privacy and intimacy are deeply related. On one account, privacy is valuable because intimacy would be impossible without it Fried, ; Gerety ; Gerstein, ; Cohen, Fried, for example, defines privacy narrowly as control over information about oneself. Privacy is valuable because it allows one control over information about oneself, which allows one to maintain varying degrees of intimacy.

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Indeed, love, friendship and trust are only possible if persons enjoy privacy and accord it to each other. In this way, privacy is also closely connected with respect and self respect. Gerstein argues as well that privacy is necessary for intimacy, and intimacy in communication and interpersonal relationships is required for us to fully experience our lives. Intimacy without intrusion or observation is required for us to have experiences with spontaneity and without shame.

Volume 1: contains asses, camelids, cattle, goats, horses and pigs Volume 2: contains sheep, water buffalo, yak and other livestock Coverage: Breed descriptions: including groups, types and varieties, history and links between groups, livestock products and trends for creating new breeds Wild species: ancestral and relatives, potential domesticants and hybridization Humans and breeds: spread of domestication, transhumance and pastoralism, social and cultural influences, suitability of different groups for different human purposes Genetics and Conservation: a dedicated section and glossary of terms Placing breeds in a practical agricultural context, this two volume encyclopedia will be of great value to agriculturalists, breeders, geneticists, biologists, rural historians, conservationists, ecologists, and all those who are interested in the rich diversity of livestock breeds.

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